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REVERSE REVOLUTION:
RUSSIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
Sarah E. Cox †
Abstract: Russia is experiencing a crisis that threatens the continued relevance of
its Constitution. This is demonstrated first by Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency
and the political crisis it has fueled. Second, it is shown by the Constitution’s inability to
remedy the political crisis due to the collapse of separation of powers and federalism in
Russia, and severe party underdevelopment. Part A of this note discusses Russia’s
political crisis, namely the demise of democracy. Part B discusses the Constitution’s
injuries, specifically the collapse of federalism, the demise of the separation of powers,
and the state’s party underdevelopment. Together, these factors signify a constitutional
crisis which can be cured only through substantive changes to the Constitution and
Russia’s electoral laws, and a normative shift in Russian politics.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In September 2011, Vladimir Putin, Russia’s current Prime Minister
and former President, surprised no one when he announced that he would
once again seek the Russian presidency.1 Later in the winter, opposition to
his candidacy arose, and a once-inevitable outcome appeared less decided.2
Nevertheless, initial criticism of his potential reelection manifested itself as
little more than disgruntled complacency,3 and those opposing his reelection
ultimately lost steam and focused less on preventing his reelection than on
achieving incremental changes to Russia’s electoral process.4 As a result,
Putin regained the Russian presidency in the spring of 2012 with relative
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1
See Ellen Barry, Putin Once More Moves to Assume Top Job in Russia, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/25/world/europe/medvedev-says-putin-will-seekrussian-presidency-in-2012.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Putin%20once%20more%20moves%20to%20
assume&st=cse.
2
See Ellen Barry, Vast Rally in Moscow is a Challenge to Putin’s Power, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/world/europe/tens-of-thousands-of-protesters-gatherin-moscow-russia.html?ref=russia.
3
See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Putin’s Eye for Power Leads Some in Russia to Ponder Life Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/world/europe/putins-eye-for-power-leads-somein-russia-to-ponder-life-abroad.html?scp=1&sq=Putin%20eye%20for%20power&st=cse.
4
Id.
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ease 5 and will likely remain in power until 2024, making his reign
comparable in length to that of the average Soviet dictators.6
Putin’s campaign and reelection should sound a warning bell for those
who hoped Russia would eventually free itself from the grip of autocracy.
Thus far it has not, in large part because the election, while disappointing,
was ostensibly legal.
Consequently, some Russians have resigned
themselves to simply leaving Russia7 and the West has begun preparing for a
renewed but familiar strain on its relationship with the Kremlin.8
Putin’s reelection sounds the final death knell for Russia’s
constitution. This is demonstrated first by Russia’s current political crisis,
which is evidenced by an acutely unstable political climate and, ultimately,
the demise of democracy in Russia. Second, it is shown by the
Constitution’s inability to remedy this crisis, caused by a breakdown in the
Constitution’s structure and mandates, specifically the separation of powers,
the federalist structure, and a multi-party framework.
Part II of this note will provide an overview of the formation and
adoption of the Russian Constitution and Putin’s rise to power. Part III will
discuss the symptoms of the constitutional crisis mentioned above. It will
describe the present political crisis, compiling and describing symptoms of
the unstable environment, as well as analyze the breakdown of the 1993
Constitution and its consequent inability to resolve the political crisis.
Finally, Part IV will suggest remedies for the constitutional crisis which
Putin’s control has created, proposing particular methods for strengthening
the other branches of the Russian government, especially the judiciary,
through the Constitutional Court.
5
Ellen Barry, Vladimir Putin Takes Helm as Police Punish Moscow Dissident, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/world/europe/vladimir-putin-returns-to-presidency-inrussia.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
6
For example, Leonid Brezhnev led the Communist Party, and therefore the Soviet Union, for
eighteen years. EDWIN BACON & MARK SANDLE, BREZHNEV RECONSIDERED 1 (Palgrave MacMillan Ltd.
2002). If Putin is reelected, he could obtain control of the Russian executive branch for an additional
twelve years, per recent legislation extending presidential terms to six years. Lucian Kim, Russia’s
Approaching Nonelection, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/opinion/30ihtedkim30.html?pagewanted=all. Together with the eight years he has already served as President and the
four he has served as Prime Minister this will total twenty-four years as Russia’s leader. Furthermore,
while a Russian President may not hold office for more than two terms in succession, nothing prevents
Putin from moving to Prime Minister for another term and then back to President. See KONSTITUTSIIA
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTIUTION], § 1, ch. 4, art. 81, cl. 3 (Russ.) (“No one person shall
hold the office of President of the Russian Federation for more than two terms in succession.”).
7
See Mydans, supra note 3.
8
See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn & Ellen Barry, Putin Contends Clinton Incited Unrest Over Vote,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/world/europe/putin-accuses-clinton-ofinstigating-russian-protests.html?_r=1&hp=&pagewanted=print (reporting Putin’s accusations of United
States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for inciting outcries against Putin).
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THE 1993 CONSTITUTION AND PAST POLITICAL PRACTICES HAVE
ESTABLISHED A SUPER-PRESIDENTIALIST GOVERNMENT IN RUSSIA

The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 created the need for a leader
who could unify Russia and bring about stability. This section will provide
background on the formation of Russia’s Constitution, explaining how Boris
Yeltsin initially assumed Russia’s leadership role. This section first
describes how Yeltsin oversaw and largely controlled the process of drafting
and adopting a presidentialist democratic constitution within a year of
assuming the presidency. Second, it explains the structure of government
established by Yeltsin’s constitution, emphasizing in particular how it held
the key to its own demise. Finally, it will explain how Russia’s
presidentialist government and Yeltsin’s “anointment” of his successor
allowed Vladimir Putin to consolidate power and undermine the
Constitution’s structures.
A.

The 1993 Constitution Establishes a Super-Presidentialist Democracy

During the Soviet Union’s sharp decline in the late 1980s, the calls for
reform by Boris Yeltsin, a young reformer and republican separatist, became
increasingly popular. 9 In 1990, he led the Russian Republic to declare
independence from the Soviet Union and helped push then Soviet president
Mikhail Gorbachev out of power.10 Though Gorbachev attempted to patch
up the broken union, party extremists, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy
Bezopasnosti or Committee for State Security (“KGB”), and the military
staged a coup and arrested Gorbachev.11 The coup failed, however, largely
due to mass protests and Yeltsin’s opposition leadership. 12 Though
Gorbachev returned to Moscow, he was politically obsolete, and Yeltsin
easily assumed power.13
In the spring of 1993, Yeltsin, then Russia’s president, proposed a
new Russian constitution and presented a draft to the Russian people.14 In
July, a Constitutional Conference comprised of two representatives from
each Russian Federation met. 15 After making over 200 amendments, the
9

Steve G. Marks, The Historical Context, in UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA 78
(Michael L. Bressler ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers 2009).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Christina M. McPherson, Russia’s 1993 Constitution: Rule of Law for Russia or Merely a Return
to Autocracy?, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 155, 156 (1999-2000).
15
Id. at 157.
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Conference approved the Constitution. 16 Concurrently, the Russian
Congress published its own draft constitution. 17 In response, Yeltsin
attempted to disband the Congress using the emergency powers granted to
him via the 1978 Constitution.18 Though the Congress initially refused to
leave power, Yeltsin eventually overcame its opposition with the support of
the military.19 On November 9, 1993, Yeltsin proposed a new draft of his
constitution, and declared that a popular referendum would be held to adopt
his constitution. Approval required 50% for adoption.20 On December 12,
1993, Russians adopted the Constitution with 60% of the vote, and the 1993
Constitution became Russia’s first democratic Constitution since 1906.21
B.

The Governmental Structure Enshrined in the Constitution Revolves
Around the Executive Branch

The government structure set forth in the 1993 Constitution has never
been without criticism, as it focuses primarily on the strength of the
executive and the relative weakness of the legislature and judiciary. 22
Indeed, the 1993 Constitution represents a “presidentialist” form of
government, which centralizes power in a strong executive, and focuses on
stability and unity.23 The president is the head of state, and the “guarantor of
the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and of human and civil rights and
liberties 24 and freedoms,” and the “Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces.”25 Furthermore, the president may dissolve the State Duma,
the lowest house of the Russian legislature, if it exercises too rigidly its
checks on the president’s power. 26 Additionally, a president is given
substantial and virtually unchecked legislative powers,27 veto power,28 and
the ability to impose martial law29 and states of emergency.30
16

Id.
Id.
18
Lee K. Metcalf, Presidential Power in the Russian Constitution, 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 125,
133 (1996).
19
See McPherson, supra note 14, at 157.
20
Id. at 158.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 155.
23
See Metcalf, supra note 18, at 125.
24
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] § 1, ch. 4, art. 80, cl. 2
(Russ.).
25
Id. § 1, ch. 4, art. 87, cl. 1 (Russ.).
26
For example, the president can dissolve the State Duma if it refuses to confirm his or her candidate
for prime minister three times, or if it expresses a no-confidence vote in the president twice in three
months. See McPherson, supra note 14, at 155.
27
The president may unilaterally pass laws in the form of decrees and executive orders. See
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONT. RF][CONSTITUTION] § 1, ch. 4, art. 90, cl. 2 (Russ.) (“The
17
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The 1993 Constitution provides for a bicameral legislature, called the
Federal Assembly.31 The lower house of the Federal Assembly is the State
Duma.32 The upper house is the Federation Council, which is comprised of
two councilors for each member of the federation.33 The 1993 Constitution
also calls for a popularly-elected president limited to two consecutive fouryear terms.34
Additionally, the Constitution sets up a judiciary,35 which includes a
Constitutional Court, 36 a Supreme Court, 37 and a Supreme Arbitration
Court.38 At the request of the President, the State Duma, one-fifth of the
members of the Federation Council or deputies of the State Duma, the
Supreme Court, the Supreme Arbitration Court, or the local bodies of
government, the Constitutional Court may resolve cases about compliance
with the Constitution of the Russian Federation.39 The Supreme Arbitration
Court of the Russian Federation resolves economic and other disputes
considered by arbitration courts, supervising their compliance with federal
legal procedures. 40 The Supreme Court is the highest body adjudicating
civil, criminal, administrative and other matters triable by general
jurisdiction courts, and supervises other courts’ compliance with federal
procedural forms.41
decrees and orders of the President of the Russian Federation shall be binding throughout the territory of
the Russian Federation.”).
28
The president exercises this power by keeping a law unsigned and unreturned for as long as he or
she wishes. See Metcalf, supra note 18, at 135.
29
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] § 1, ch. 5, art. 87, cl. 2
(Russ.) (“In the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or an immediate threat thereof, the
President of the Russian Federation shall introduce martial law on the territory of the Russian Federation or
in areas thereof with immediate notification thereof of the Federation Council and the State Duma.”).
30
Id. § 1, ch. 5, art. 88 (“Under the circumstances and procedures envisaged by the Federal
Constitutional Law, the President of the Russian Federation shall impose a state of emergency on the
territory of the Russian Federation or in areas thereof with immediate notification of the Federation Council
and the State Duma.”).
31
See Metcalf, supra note 18, at 134.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] § 1, ch. 4, art. 81, cl. 1
(Russ.) (“The President of the Russian Federation shall be elected for a term of four years by the citizens of
the Russian Federation on the basis of general, equal and direct vote by secret ballot.”); Id. § 1, ch. 4, art.
81, cl. 3 (“No one person shall hold the office of President of the Russian Federation for more than two
terms in succession.”).
35
Id. § 1, ch. 7.
36
Id. § 1, ch. 7, art. 125.
37
Id. § 1, ch. 7, art. 126.
38
Id. § 1, ch. 7, art. 127.
39
Id. § 1, ch. 7, art. 125, cl. 2.
40
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] § 1, ch. 7, art. 127.
41
Id. § 1, ch. 7, art. 126.
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While the constitutional provisions described above seem to beg for a
dictator, the Constitution also outlines restraints to the president’s power.
For example the president may be removed if the State Duma concludes that
the president has committed treason or another “grave crime,” the Supreme
Court qualifies the actions as criminal, or the Constitutional Court concludes
that the proper procedures have been followed. The Federation Council
must adopt an impeachment decision by two-thirds vote within three months
of either of the requisite accusations.42
Additionally, the State Duma can request a determination by the
Constitutional Court of the constitutionality of a law, including those
promulgated through executive decrees and orders. The State Duma must
approve any presidential decrees imposing martial law or a state of
emergency, 43 and must consent to the President’s appointment of the
Chairman of the Government. 44 The checks on presidential power have
allowed at least the trappings of the structure of government established by
the Constitution to remain durable over the past eighteen years.
Nevertheless, as discussed in Part III.A, its institutional structure created an
environment ripe for a return to autocracy.
C.

Yeltsin’s “Anointment” of Putin Ensured Putin’s Rise to and
Consolidation of Power

Although he began his presidency as a purported compromiser
interested in establishing democracy, Boris Yeltsin undermined his own
rhetoric and the democratic principles outlined in his 1993 Constitution by
relinquishing his power to Putin in 1999, before the expiration of his term.45
In doing so, he undermined free and broad campaigning by leveraging his
popularity to name a successor.46 This created a shortened campaign period,

42

See Metcalf, supra note 18, at 134.
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF][CONSTITUTION] § 1, ch. 5, art. 102, cl. 1.
(Russ.) (“The jurisdiction of the Federation Council shall include: . . . b) approval of the decree of the
President of the Russian Federation on the introduction of martial law; c) approval of the decree of the
President of the Russian Federation on the introduction of a state of emergency.”).
44
Id. § 1, ch. 6, art. 111, cl. 1. The Chairman of the Government acts as liaison between the
executive branch and the other branches of government, overseeing the general workings of the
government. See generally, id. § 1, ch. 6 (requiring the Chairman of the Government to propose the
structure of the federal branches of executive power, determine guidelines of the government’s work, and
to develop the budget of the government).
45
See JOEL M. OSTROW, GEORGIY A. SATAROV, & IRINA M. KHAKAMADA, THE CONSOLIDATION OF
DICTATORSHIP IN RUSSIA: AN INSIDE VIEW OF THE DEMISE OF DEMOCRACY 79 (Greenwood Publ’g Grp.
2007).
46
Id.
43
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forcing his supporters to go along with his decision. 47 It also caused
unprepared parties to surrender their hopes for potential campaigns,
frustrating any possibility of true political competition. 48 Additionally,
Yeltsin’s conspicuous involvement in the campaign and relentless support
for Putin effectively quashed any possibility of a free and fair election.49
Worst of all, Yeltsin’s anointment of Putin set a precedent for commending
successors, a practice on which Putin would later capitalize.
Russians were unfamiliar with Vladimir Putin, the loyal former KGB
agent selected to succeed Yeltsin.50 Indeed, before winning the presidency,
he had never been elected to public office.51 He had spent his early career as
a KGB agent in East Germany, returning to Russia in 1990 to work in
politics.52 In 1996, he found work in Yeltsin’s presidential administration
through personal connections, and Yeltsin named him director of the Federal
Security Service in 1998.53 Recognizing Putin’s steadfast loyalty, Yeltsin
nominated and the Duma confirmed Putin as Prime Minister in August of
1999, less than a year before the presidential election. 54 He was easily
elected in 2000.55 As discussed below, Putin’s reign has been characterized
by impermanent political stability achieved through a strong state achieved
predominantly via a strong Kremlin. 56 Gradually, Putin has ensured that
Russia’s executive controls politics, the economy, and society in general.57
He has thus preserved and strengthened Russia’s “super-presidential
system,” but in doing so has created a constitutional crisis.
III.

PUTIN’S REIGN HAS CAUSED A CONSTITUTION CRISIS IN RUSSIA

Russia is experiencing a constitutional crisis that has crippled the
relevance of the 1993 Constitution, which technically remains in effect
today. This crisis is exposed first by a political crisis, evidenced by Putin’s
continued grasp on power and the resultant failure of democratic functions in
47

Id.
Id.
49
Id.
50
MICHAEL MCFAUL, NIKOLAI PETROV, & ANDREI RYABOV, BETWEEN DICTATORSHIP AND
DEMOCRACY: RUSSIAN POST-COMMUNIST POLITICAL REFORM 295 (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace 2004).
51
See Michael L. Bressler, Politics, in UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA 105 (Michael L.
Bressler ed., Lynne Rienner Publishers 2009).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 106.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 109.
56
Id. at 110-11.
57
Bressler, supra note 51 at 110-11.
48
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Russia. Second, political crises such as the collapse of the separation of
powers and federalism and the rise of single-party politics expose the
Constitution’s ineffective means for dealing with such crises.
This section discusses each of these factors in turn. Part A discusses
the political crisis (i.e., the demise of democracy), and Part B discusses the
Constitution’s failures (i.e., the collapse of separation of powers and
federalism and political party underdevelopment). Together, these factors
signify a constitutional crisis that can be remedied only through substantive
changes to the Constitution and Russia’s elections laws, and an attitudinal
change by the Russian people.
A.

Putin’s Actions Throughout his First Presidency Compromised
Democracy in Russia and Led to a Political Crisis

Putin’s continued control, particularly his renewed candidacy and
likely reelection, has shattered the democratic political structures required by
the 1993 Constitution. Indeed, he has executed a disconcertingly rapid
movement toward autocracy in Russia. He accomplished this transition in
three ways. First, he tightly restricted and largely crippled Russia’s free
media. Second, he has undermined the democracy of regional elections.
Third, facilitated in part by his predecessor, he ensured that presidential
elections are neither free nor fair. Together, these factors indicate that
despite the 1993 Constitution’s democratic mandate, Russia is now
undeniably autocratic, with one party, indeed one person, controlling
essentially every level and aspect of government.
1.

Putin Stifled the Free Media During his First Presidency

Freedom of the press and media is crucial to the development and
maintenance of civil society. 58 Unfortunately, despite his claims of
commitment to democracy, in one of his first moves as President, Putin
forcefully reigned in Russia’s media, which he publicly criticized for its
supposedly “unpatriotic” tendencies. 59 He did this first by creating the
Information Security Doctrine, an executive order severely restricting
freedom of information.60 Second, using members of the judiciary whom he
largely controlled,61 Putin used the courts to attack critical and independent
58
Louis Skyner, Public Power and Private Interests: the Media, the Law and Democracy in Russia,
4 PERSP. ON EUR. POL. & SOC’Y, 265, 271 (2003).
59
See MCFAUL, PETROV, & RYABOV, supra note 50, at 295.
60
Id. at 189.
61
Id.
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media empires.62 For example, he threatened and eventually quashed state
critic Vladimir Gusinsky, the majority shareholder of Russia’s NTV, one of
the few remaining independent media companies, with frivolous criminal
charges.63 Third, Putin capitalized on conflicts between another prominent
independent media company’s shareholders, closing it under a façade of
financial failure. 64 The effect of these moves has been the downfall of
independent Russian media and the silencing of would-be Putin critics.65
2.

Putin Undermined the Democracy of Regional Elections in his First
Presidency

Since Putin’s election in 2000, the democratic integrity of regional
elections in Russia has been severely compromised. 66 In particular, the
Kremlin has interfered extensively with local elections, ensuring that the
outcomes of local electoral systems are dictated predominantly by the
state.67 Furthermore, in 2004, Putin used his political power to push through
amendments to the electoral system that “dealt a serious blow to the
development of democracy.” 68 These amendments constrain burgeoning
opposition parties’ ability to participate in elections, and increased United
Russia’s success in local elections.69 For example, to be a legally registered
party, a political group must now have at least 50,000 members and regional
members in over half of the population.70 The effect of this law is to make
certain that minority political factions are unable to gain the strength or leg
required to challenge the already-entrenched parties.71 This effect is shown
by the fact that the vast majority of local elections only include the four
parties that currently hold seats in the State Duma.72
Further weakening the democratic nature of regional elections is the
fact that only the party that wins the most seats in a regional legislature has
62

Id.
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See generally, Cameron Ross, Regional Elections and Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia, 63
EUR.-ASIA STUD. 641 (2011) (finding that “[e]lections in Russia’s regions are more often instruments of
authoritarian rule than instruments of democracy and the electoral rules of the game have been designed to
favour United Russia”).
67
Id. at 642. Specifically, local electoral systems are “first past the post single mandate” elections.
This means that whoever gets the most votes, regardless of whether he or she has a majority of the votes,
wins. Consequently, larger parties (presumably with greater resources) gain a disproportionately large
number of seats.
68
Id. at 643.
69
Id.
70
Federal’nyi Zakon Federal Law, No. 168, Dec. 20, 2004.
71
See Ross, supra note 66, at 644.
72
Id.
63
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the right to nominate candidates for the post of governor, and also the fact
that the President now must approve the candidate nominated. 73 This
ensures governors’ affiliation with the Kremlin, as United Russia has a
majority in eighty-one of Russia’s eighty-three local legislatures. 74
Additionally, via the “Law on Combating Extremist Activity,” an increased
number of state officials are now permitted to serve on electoral
commissions, and the government can now ban parties from elections if any
of its members have been charged with “extremist activities.”75 This law
may be and likely is used to frustrate challenges by potential renegade
candidates.76
Changes to electoral law under Putin have predominantly abolished
the “votes against all” category from ballots, whereby a citizen can
demonstrate his or her disapproval of the electoral system. 77 This has
silenced one of the few remaining opportunities for a citizen to voice his or
her disapproval of the Kremlin’s candidates and to the process in general.
Furthermore, minimum turnout thresholds have been abolished. 78 This
means that parties’ candidates can win without anybody showing up to
exercise his or her franchise.79
Finally, in a comprehensive empirical analysis of Russia’s regional
elections, political scientist Cameron Ross 80 found that, overall, regional
elections do not provide voters with a genuine choice of competing
candidates and parties, registration and voting procedures are exclusive,
inaccessible, and are fraught with government and party control,
intimidation, and abuse.81 In addition, Ross found that citizens are not free
to cast their votes in secret or without pressure and coercion from the state,
elections are not conducted fairly, ballots are not fairly counted and the
results of elections do not reflect the true will of the electorate.82 Together,
these data points demonstrate that, despite the 1993 Constitution’s
democratic mandate, Russian regional elections are now disturbingly
undemocratic.

73

Id. at 645.
Id.
Federal Law, No. 107, July 12, 2006.
76
See Ross, supra note 66, at 647.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Cameron Ross is a political scientist and professor in Russian Politics at the University of Dundee.
See Ross, supra note 66, at 641.
81
Id. at 659-60.
82
Id.
74
75
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B. The Democracy of Presidential Elections Has Been Severely
Weakened by Presidential Anointments Since Russia Adopted the
1993 Constitution
Executive control has undermined the liberty of Russia’s elections
since the adoption of the 1993 Constitution, particularly since Putin’s
election. In most democracies, free elections function to legitimize rulers,
articulate the voters’ will, provide insight into public opinion, and establish a
stable government.83 In new democracies, free elections also serve to bolster
and ease the transition from autocracy to democracy.84 In 1999 and early
2000, however, first Yeltsin moved immediately away from the
Constitution’s democratic mandate for elections by setting a precedent for
undemocratic Presidential elections. Specifically, his over-involvement in
the campaign and relentless support for Putin debilitated Putin’s
challengers. 85 More importantly, however, his anointment of Putin set a
precedent for commending successors, a practice which Putin himself
capitalized on.86 Indeed, one study found that 90% of voters who voted for
Medvedev considered Putin’s endorsement of Medvedev either important or
very important to their voting decision.
When he neared the end of his first term as President, Putin mirrored
the undemocratic actions of his predecessor by publicly supporting and
effectively anointing Dmitri Medvedev as his successor.87 Recent Russian
President Dmitri Medvedev’s 2008 election was fraught with involvement
by the Kremlin, and was not free, fair, or democratic.88 Indeed, it has been
called the “most highly managed political event in Russia’s post-communist
history.” 89 Medvedev was nominated in December 2007, shortly after
United Russia gained an overwhelming victory in parliamentary elections.90
When accepting his nomination, he said that he would run for president only
if Putin would serve as prime minister if elected. 91 Russian citizens
understood Medvedev as Putin’s mentee, and the Kremlin relentlessly tied
his candidacy to his relationship with Putin. 92 For example, the state83

Stanislaw Gebethner, Free Elections and Political Parties in Transition to Democracy in Central
and Southeastern Europe, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 381, 381 (1997).
84
Id. at 381-82.
85
See MCFAUL, PETROV, & RYABOV, supra note 50, at 295.
86
Henry E. Hale & Timothy J. Colton, Russians and the Putin-Medvedev “Tandemocracy”: A
Survey-Based Portrait of the 2007–2008 Election Season 57:2 PROBS. OF POST-COMMUNISM, 3, 16 (2010).
87
Id.
88
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, It Is Still Putin’s Russia, 107 CURRENT HIST. 315, 316 (2008).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
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controlled media constantly covered Medvedev and Putin’s travels together,
and huge billboards of the two walking shoulder-to-shoulder hung in city
squares across the country, including the square outside the Kremlin. 93
More frighteningly, advisors to the Kremlin leaked information that
Medvedev was taking classes to learn to speak and walk like Putin.94
For voters, electing Medvedev meant continuing Putin’s policies.
Nevertheless, the Kremlin felt that it needed to go further to secure
Medvedev’s election. Putin moved also to ensure that Medvedev had other
unfair advantages, and he and his supporters largely orchestrated
Medvedev’s election.95 First, media loyal to Putin ensured that coverage of
the election was asymmetric, heavily favoring the state’s political views.96
While there were anti-regime critics and opposition coverage by websites,
most Russians obtained information through the state-controlled television.97
Furthermore, the government constrained opposition parties’ opportunities
for garnering votes, almost completely shutting them out of all positions of
true influence. 98 Ultimately the only other major parties to successfully
place candidates on the ballot were the Communist Party and the Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia (“LDPR”), both of which nominated the same
party leaders they had since 1996.99 When Russian voters went to the polls
in 2008, they had only one viable option.
The 2012 campaign largely mirrored that of Putin in 2000 and
Medvedev in 2008. First, Medvedev reciprocated his own anointment by
choosing to step aside to allow Putin to regain the presidency, rather than
run for a second term.100 The move was a significant political sacrifice for
Medvedev, who is now perceived to have been a weak pawn in a complex
political arrangement.101 Moreover, Putin won a landslide victory, and his
competition remained symbolic at best. 102 It now appears likely that his
reelection will further entrench Russia’s government in autocracy.
Since Putin’s first election, Russia has transitioned from the
democracy the Constitution purported to create in 1993 to an autocracy.
This move was achieved and is demonstrated in three ways. First, it was
achieved through the restriction of the freedom of the press, which is now
93
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nearly nonexistent. Instead, as described above in Part III.A.1, it is largely
state-controlled. This has ensured that the Russian people receive their
information predominantly from the Kremlin. Second, the move away from
democracy was achieved by diluting the democracy of regional elections.
As described above, changes to the regional electoral system since Putin’s
election have ensured that the Kremlin’s adversaries are unable to truly
challenge its allies. Third, and facilitated in part by Yeltsin, presidential
elections in Russia are now neither free nor fair. Not only have all Russian
presidents “anointed” their successors, but also the state-controlled media
and Kremlin election control have guaranteed that Russian voters do not
have a true choice when it comes time to cast their ballots. Together, these
factors indicate that despite the 1993 Constitution’s democratic mandate,
Russia is now undeniably autocratic.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE 1993 CONSTITUTION’S STRUCTURAL
SAFEGUARDS HAS CRIPPLED ITS ABILITY TO REMEDY RUSSIA’S
POLITICAL CRISIS

IV.

As it currently stands, Russia’s 1993 Constitution can do nothing to
remedy the state’s rejection of the political system it establishes. Its
helplessness in this regard is revealed first by the collapse of separation of
powers enshrined in the Constitution, which normally should function as a
check against autocratic rule. Second, the Constitution’s inability to remedy
the crisis is exacerbated by the state’s now feeble federalism, which should
also check against despotic state rule.
Finally, severe party
underdevelopment and political apathy in Russia now work to preserve its
autocratic state, crippling a last-resort check on autocracy. Together, the
breakdown of these constitutional structures demonstrates that Russia is
experiencing a constitutional crisis, in that the 1993 Constitution can do
nothing to prevent Putin and United Russia’s continued grip on power for
the foreseeable future.
A.

Putin’s Presidency Undermined the Separation of Powers in Russia

The 1993 Constitution establishes a tripartite government structure
comprised of a president and the accompanying executive branch, a
bicameral legislature, and the judiciary.103 The judiciary is composed of the
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Arbitration Court of
the Russian Federation, and the Constitutional Court of the Russian
103
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Federation.104 While the Constitution establishes a “presidentialist” form of
government which centralizes power in a strong executive, it nevertheless
separates the legislative, executive, and judicial powers.105 In constitutional
systems, separating the powers of government operates as a structural “backup system,” designed to prevent political actors from evading the democratic
system the Constitution creates. 106 Unfortunately, the 1993 Constitution
contained the keys to the demise of Russia’s separation of powers, and the
legislative and judicial branches of the government now largely serve at the
pleasure of the President.
The divisions of power between the executive branch and the State
Duma has been obscured, and indeed, eliminated since Putin’s 2000
election. 107 This has been achieved by United Russia, Putin’s political
affiliate, gaining and maintaining a huge majority in the State Duma. 108
Indeed, in the Fourth Duma (2003-2007), United Russia held a two-thirds
majority.109 In the December 2007 election, preceding Medvedev’s March
2008 election, United Russia gained even more seats.110 The last decade has
thus solidified United Russia as Russia’s party, in both the executive and
legislative branches. This has allowed Putin to push through his legislative
agenda111 without much effort, and often before potential opponents have an
opportunity to thwart it.112
Putin and United Russia have ensured that the dominant party’s
members in parliament vote according to the executive’s will primarily
through political patronage.113 This is evidenced by the fact that the last
decade in the State Duma has seen remarkable cohesiveness in voting among
United Russia’s representatives. 114 Specifically, United Russia has
experienced staggeringly high levels of voting discipline in the last decade
(voting in line with party preferences), which has increased since 1994.115
104
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Furthermore, United Russia has accumulated immense power since Putin’s
election–forming unofficial “deputy groups” within its own party rather than
establishing separate parties for voters to choose between.116
Further solidifying the interconnectedness of the executive and
legislative branches in Russia is the fact that polarization between the two
branches has declined sharply since the 1990s.117 In 2001, the Unity party
and the Fatherland–All Russia (“OVR”) party combined to form what is now
known as United Russia. Furthermore, United Russia allied with the
People’s Deputy and Russia’s Regions parties to form the “coalition of
four.”118 The untied parties voted together, and Putin used their majority to
enact his agenda. 119 Putin also capitalized on the precarious economic
condition in Russia, arguing that a failure to enact his legislative agenda
would sentence Russia to permanent economic recession.120
During the Fourth Duma, United Russia established nearly
unmatchable control over the Duma. Putin used his affiliation with United
Russia to centralize political power, ending the independence of regional
governors, controlling the mass media as described above, neutralizing
opposition parties (described below), and reducing the parliament’s
accountability.121 As with most autocracies in which opposition may slow
legislation, the State Duma became remarkably productive in the Fourth
Duma, passing 1,000 laws.122 This reflects the consolidation of power under
United Russia and its remarkable control over the legislative agenda.
Further emphasizing this point is the fact that Putin signed nearly everything
the Duma passed. 123 Additionally, the Duma readily enacted Putin’s
initiatives which centralized power and undermined democracy. For
example, one initiative it passed restricted the conditions under which
citizens can hold demonstrations and another makes it more difficult for
citizens’ initiative groups to organize nationwide referendums.124
Putin further expunged the line between presidential policy and
legislation in his second term, capitalizing in large part on 2004 terrorist
attacks on the Moscow subway.125 For example, the legislature passed the
bill, described above, providing for presidential appointment of governors in
116
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the wake of the 2004 terrorist attacks.126 Moreover, in a move highlighting
Putin’s now undeniable control over the Duma, Putin met with the
legislature in 2005, assigning it fifteen tasks for passing the policy initiatives
he had presented in his April message to parliament. 127 This move
demonstrated Putin’s control over Russian legislative policy and the collapse
of the Constitution’s division of powers between the President and
parliament.
Like the parliament, the judiciary has failed to exert a check on the
President and reinforce the separation of powers and federalist structures
established in the Constitution. This failure has largely been due to the
judiciary’s lack of compliance with the Constitutional Court’s rulings, as
well as the public’s perception of the judiciary’s weakness.128 Consequently,
and predominantly due to the weakness of the Russian Constitutional Court,
the judiciary arguably embodies a tool for legitimization of the President’s
agenda. Russia’s Constitutional Court reviews the constitutionality of laws
in Russia, ensuring compliance with the Constitution and governmental
structures. 129 Nevertheless, the Russian Constitutional Court has been
unable to protect the individual rights laid out in the country’s Constitution,
and, more importantly, unable to combat the incremental legislation
centralizing power in the President. 130 This inability has been caused
primarily by noncompliance with its decisions. Indeed, the Constitutional
Court has constantly combated failure to comply with its directives, and the
Kremlin under both Yeltsin and Putin failed to implement numerous
decisions on basic rights.131
Widespread ignorance by the Russian populace of the Court’s actions
has weakened its power. 132 These factors have likely led to a cycle that
works to further weaken the Constitutional Court, and causing further
noncompliance due to its perceived weakness.133 Thus, while the supposed
guardian of the Constitution’s structures, the Constitutional Court remains
largely peripheral in the Russian government, and may have only the
influence it is granted by the Kremlin.
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B. Putin’s Presidential Policies Led to the Collapse of Federalism in
Russia
Federalism is another back-up system designed to protect democratic
political structure from domination by the state and its favored party in
constitutional democracies. 134 Constitutional democracies that set up
federations presume that powers will be divided between a central
government and subnational governments.135 As described above, Article 1
of the 1993 Constitution establishes Russia as a “federation,” a “democratic
federative rule-of-law state with a republican form of government.” 136
Russia’s federal system is divided into eighty-three “subjects” that are in
turn divided into twenty-one republics, forty-six provinces, nine territories,
four autonomous “areas,” one autonomist oblast, and two federal cities.137
At the second level of government there are seven federal “super districts”
(Okrugs) which were created by Putin to check the power of regional
governors. 138 Despite this structure and the Constitution’s federalist
mandate, Putin’s presidency has marked the centralization of power in
Russia and a move toward a quasi-unitary, rather than federal, state. 139
Additionally, while some hoped that President Medvedev might move away
from Putin’s centralist policies, he did not do so during his presidency.140
In his first move away from federalism, Putin oversaw the passage of
legislation that reigned in regional governors, ensuring that they now serve
at the pleasure of the President. First, he pushed through legislation that
requires Presidential approval of candidates nominated for governor, and
gave the President the power to appoint governors.141 Furthermore, through
United Russia, he shepherded the reigning in of regional governors,
gradually enticing them through patronage, coercion, fraud, oppression, and
elite cohesion, to join his ranks.142 These changes have jeopardized, and
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largely undermined the independence of regional governments and provided
for the consolidation of the Russian government under the Kremlin.143
Second, the upper chamber of Russia’s legislature, the Russian
Federation Council, no longer serves to accommodate regional interests, and
instead is controlled by the Kremlin. 144 Putin accomplished this through
changes to the composition of the Council of the Federation, particularly by
requiring that the president appoint formerly elected gubernatorial
representatives, rather than allowing the people to elect their
representative. 145 Technically, this requirement did not violate the
Constitution. While it does require that two representatives from each
component of the federation are elected to the Council, it does not prescribe
a method for choosing the representatives.146 These changes ensured a new
composition of the Council of Federation, which has been reflected in the
compliance and passivity of the upper chamber of the Council.147
Further entrenching the power of the federal government, and in order
to exert control over the people, Putin also created the office of the
polnomochennyi predstavitel’ prezidenta (“polpredy”), a “plenipotentiary
representative of the president,” for each of the seven super-districts in
Russia. 148 The polpredy oversee the seven Russian districts, and are
considered watchdogs of the president, supervising implementation of
federal laws and providing information to the president.149 Five of the first
seven polpredy had experience in the military or security forces.150
The above changes, although each technically constitutional, have
altered the governmental structures in Russia, crippling the federalist system
the Constitution creates. To this end, changes made under Putin ultimately
allowed him to consolidate power to the executive. This, in turn, has
severely undermined the Constitution’s effectiveness in remedying the
political crisis using its federalist check.
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Chronic Party Underdevelopment Has Undermined the Constitution’s
Ability to Remedy Russia’s Political Crisis

Another widely recognized pillar of democracy is the existence of
political parties. 151 Nevertheless, and despite the 1993 Constitution’s
preservation of a “multi-party system,”152 parties have failed to significantly
influence Russian politics under Putin’s regime.153 United Russia operates
predominantly to serve the President’s wishes.154 Indeed, other parties in
Russia have exerted little influence over Russia’s presidents, prime
ministers, and the Federation Council, and only moderate to little influence
over the State Duma.155
Despite ostensible party affiliation by Putin and other presidential
candidates, parties have not played a significant role in presidential politics
since the adoption of the 1993 Constitution.156 Neither Medvedev nor Putin
ever affiliated with a party. 157 Additionally, President Yeltsin distanced
himself from parties, including those that supported him.158 Furthermore,
parties have rarely played a role even for candidates who were not elected.159
Indeed, in 1991, only the third-place candidate had a real party affiliation. 160
In 1996, three of five serious candidates were affiliated with a party.161
Parties have also played little role in the legislature.162 They have
failed almost completely to infiltrate the Federation Council, the
legislature’s upper house.163 However, they have played a real role in the
State Duma.164 Indeed, four different parties competed in every State Duma
election in the 1990s.165 Nevertheless, the State Duma is the lowest chamber
of the legislature and less powerful than the Federation Council.166 That no
new party has managed to challenge these four established parties
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exacerbates this problem.167 Consequently, even in the State Duma, parties
play a small role in comparison to the role played by parties in other
democratic countries.168
Parties have not successfully reached much of Russia’s population.169
For example, a survey conducted in 2004 indicated that only United Russia
(the party Putin has the most ties to) has made an impact on the Russian
people. 170 Furthermore, only about 10% of people reported having ever
spoken with a party.171 Additionally, evidence shows that the people are
simply inclined to accept Putin’s policy approaches. 172 This perhaps
contributes to the disconnection they feel with political parties in general.173
Separation of powers, federalism, and the development of political
parties, accomplished through incremental, technically constitutional
legislation, have failed in Russia and have crippled the 1993 Constitution.
Consequently, the Constitution is unable to bring about a return to the
democratic political structure it set out to create, and instead ensures that the
President remains the center of the government and that the other branches
cater to his will. Together, the failure of democracy and the failure of the
Constitution to save democracy demonstrate that the Russia is experiencing
a constitutional crisis.
THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY AND INSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS
CAN REMEDY RUSSIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

V.

Despite the dire picture painted in Parts II and III, recent
developments indicate that the situation in Russia is not as dire as it might
appear. It is potentially remediable.174 Indeed, there is reason to believe that
Russia’s Constitution and political system could be revitalized through
political and legal reform.175 The failure of democracy could be resolved
first by restoring free media and developing other media outlets in Russia.
Second, it could be achieved by restoring free and fair regional elections in
Russia. Third, it could be achieved by restoring free and fair presidential
election. The inability of the 1993 Constitution to remedy the political crisis
should be resolved by reinstating its institutional safeguards, namely the
167
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separation of powers, federalism, and multi-party development. This section
will show how each of these solutions can salvage the 1993 Constitution.
A.
A Revival of Free Media and Return to Free Elections Will Help
Strengthen and Restore Democracy in Russia
Russia’s political crisis exists in part because in silencing his critics
Putin undermined free elections. These changes have effectively killed
democracy in Russia, resulting in a political crisis. Nevertheless, Russia’s
political crisis could and should be remedied by restoring the freedom of the
press and renewing the democratic nature of regional and presidential
election. Specifically, Russian dissidents could overcome Putin’s monopoly
on traditional media by organizing and voicing their dissatisfaction through
online media and social networking sites. Furthermore, Russians should
restore the democracy of regional elections and presidential elections by
eliminating “first-past-the-post” regional elections, adding a “votes against
all” category to ballots, and establishing minimum turnout thresholds.
Finally, free and fair presidential elections could be restored by abolishing
the practice of anointing successors, press coverage of covering opposition
candidates, and minimizing state involvement in campaigns.
1.
Russians Should Overcome Putin’s Monopoly on Traditional Media by
Capitalizing on Online Media and Social Networking Sites
Russian citizens should help remedy Russia’s political crisis as can
leaders committed to democracy political strength by voicing dissatisfaction
with the status quo. Protests in the winter of 2011 and 2012 indicated that
this remedy is reasonable, and that Russian citizens may not be as
complacent as some Western commentators have assumed them to be, and
may no longer tolerate the defecation of their Constitution and the structures
it sets out to safeguard.176 Indeed, in December 2011, “tens of thousands of
citizens” protested in Moscow for a huge antigovernment demonstration.177
The protests were the first of their type since Putin obtained the Presidency
in 2000.178 To ensure that such dissidents are heard, any media that remains
free should cover the protests and ensure that their messages are
disseminated. Because of the comprehensive state control 179 this may
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require the use of untraditional media sources such as online dissemination,
specifically, informal blogs and coverage by international sources.
Dissidents’ voices, stemmed in large part by the December 2011
protests, may be gaining traction, indicating that mobilization of the Russian
people may indeed be working slowly to remedy the political crisis.180 This
is demonstrated by recent parliamentary elections, which may represent a
move away from autocratic control of United Russia.181 Indeed, in those
elections, United Russia barely maintained a 50% majority, with three
minority parties now represented in parliament.182 This may indicate that the
people will no longer acquiesce to Putin and United Russia’s unbridled
power, and that Russia still contains remnants of democracy.183
Recent revolutions and protests in Africa and the Middle East indicate
that use of social networking sites and nontraditional online media may be a
viable option for voicing opposition to the Kremlin and bringing about a
return to democracy.184 For example, social media proved a valuable tool
for organizing opposition to Egypt’s President Mubarak in the summer of
2011, allowing for mass protests and a relatively peaceful revolution. 185
Thus, while Russians may be unable to use traditional media outlets, social
networking sites could be a way to overcome Putin’s monopoly on the
media.
President Putin and Prime Minister Medvedev continue to pay lip
service to democracy. 186 For example, in 2010, Putin defended his
commitment to democracy, saying that Americans “first elect the electors
and then they vote for the presidential candidates,” but that in Russia “the
president is elected through the direct vote of the whole population,” which,
“might be even more democratic.”187 Furthermore, President Medvedev has
repeatedly reiterated his own commitment to democracy, going so far as to

180

Id.
David M. Herszenhorn & Ellen Barry, Majority for Putin’s Party Narrows in Rebuke from Voters,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/world/europe/russians-vote-governingparty-claims-early-victory.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Majority%20for%20Putin%E2%80%99s%20Party%20
Narrows&st=cse.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
See Jennifer Preston, Movement Began with Outrage and a Facebook Page that Gave it an Outlet,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/middleeast/06face.html?page
wanted=1&sq=social network egypt&st=cse&scp=2.
186
Rebecca Leung, Putin Defends His ‘Democracy,’ CBS NEWS, Feb. 11, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-693422.html?pageNum=2&tag=contentMain;contentBody.
187
Id.
181

JANUARY 2013

REVERSE REVOLUTION

201

call for reforms of Russia’s political system.188 This indicates that, despite
their actions otherwise, even the most staunchly undemocratic Russian
leaders might respond to outcry from the people.
2.
The Freedom of Regional Elections Can be Restored by Eliminating
“First-Past-the-Post” Votes, Adding a “Votes Against All” Category to
Ballots, and Establishing Minimum Voter Turnout Thresholds
Several changes to regional elections will help restore the democracy
of regional elections. First, the elimination of “first-past-the-post” voting,
the addition of a “votes against all” category to ballots, and the use of
minimum turnout thresholds will help put democracy back into democratic
elections. “First-past-the-post,” single mandate voting in regional elections,
in which whoever gets the most votes wins, has allowed already-powerful
parties to maintain control and thwart minority parties.189 Consequently, this
form of voting should be eliminated and replaced with absolute majority rule
voting, in which the winning party must achieve a majority of the votes in
order to gain the seat(s) it is running for.190 While it could be argued that
this bolsters the “tyranny of the majority,” majority rule voting could force
the majority to occasionally acquiesce to minority viewpoints and would
require the electorate to clearly legitimize that party.191 As it stands now,
first-past-the-post regional elections allow the majority party to ignore
minority party positions.192
Russia’s regions should also reinstate the “votes against all” category
on their ballots. This category, while seeming perhaps merely symbolic,
would operate as a clear protest of the status quo, and could restore voters’
perception that their voices matter.193 The drawback of “votes against all”
categories is the unlikely chance that they will result in a failure to elect any
person to a position. 194 Nevertheless, the use of a “votes against all”
category would represent a small step which would allow Russian voters an
opportunity to voice their displeasure with candidates or the government in
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general, and to do so anonymously.195 Furthermore, publishing these votes
to the public could encourage other forms of dissent.
Finally, minimum turnout thresholds should be imposed upon regional
elections. Minimum turnout thresholds are designed to ensure that a
particular candidate does not win by default, and that candidates are not
incentivized to discourage citizens from exercising their franchise in voting.
This simple reform would force Russia’s regional candidates to achieve a
true mandate from voters, and would also simply support participation in the
electoral process, and therefore democracy, by Russians.196
3.
Russia Should Restore Democratic Presidential Elections by
Engaging in Normative and Electoral Reform
The democracy of presidential elections should be restored by
abolishing the practice of anointing successors, increasing coverage of
opposition candidates, and minimizing state involvement in campaigns.
First and foremost, the practice of effectively “anointing successors,” should
be abolished. Anointing successors not only discourages voters by signaling
that the President has already chosen a successor, but it also gives the
anointed candidate an unfair advantage, by catapulting their publicity
campaign and putting the force of the Kremlin behind them. Furthermore, in
a state in which opposition is seldom tolerated, anointing successors is likely
to discourage minority candidates from expending time and capital to
overcome the anointed successor’s advantage.197 Consequently, the practice
should simply be legally abolished.
To further bolster the democracy of presidential elections, media
outlets in Russia should make a point of covering opposition candidates,
who are at a major disadvantage when it comes to disseminating their
message and reaching voters. While Putin and United Russia’s control over
conventional press sources likely render this infeasible through traditional
outlets, social networking sites, and blogs could help remedy this problem.
The existence of Vkontakte, Russia’s largest social networking site,
evidences the viability of this option. In the future, however, it would also
be advisable for the Kremlin to relinquish control of traditional media
outlets.198
Finally, state involvement in campaigns for president should be
minimized. Specifically, state resources should not be used to fund or
195
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support particular candidates’ campaigns.
Like abolishing political
anointment of successors, minimizing state involvement will help ensure
that no candidate receives the unfair advantage of a state mandate.
Furthermore, it will remove the fear of voters that choosing a candidate not
endorsed by the Kremlin will not meet with retribution by authorities.
Together, this reform, along with the abolishment of the practice of
anointing successors and coverage of minority candidates, will simply
ensure that voters have a real choice when it comes to presidential elections,
and that they will not be afraid to exercise their franchise freely.
B.

Legislative and Constitutional Changes Can Restore the Separation of
Powers, Federalism, and Party Development in Russia

While restoring democracy is the first step away from autocracy and
toward restoration of the 1993 Constitution, democracy in Russia should be
safeguarded by restoring the separation of powers, federalism, and party
development in Russia. The separation of powers in Russia can be restored
by weakening the executive branch of government and strengthening the
other branches. Federalism can be restored by retracting Putin’s regional
electoral reforms and by eliminating the office of the polpredy. Finally,
party development can be improved by breaking-up United Russia, fostering
the development of minority parties, and rejecting political patronage.
1. Russians Should Amend their Constitution to Weaken the Executive
Branch and Strengthen the Judicial and Legislative Branches, Thereby
Restoring the Separation of Powers
To bolster legislative reforms, Russians should consider amending the
1993 Constitution to weaken the executive branch and strengthen other
branches. This would take considerable political effort, 199 but would
nevertheless help restore the Constitution’s safeguards of separation of
powers. First, the clause of the Constitution giving the President the power
to formally propose legislation should be removed.200 This would require
more widespread support before the President’s policies are introduced and
insulate legislators from presidential control and over-influence.
Furthermore, a recent amendment to the Constitution, which extended
presidential terms from four to six years, should be removed. 201 As
described above, the ability of a president to remain in office for twelve
199
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consecutive years may come to mirror some of the terms of the Soviet
autocrats, ensuring, therefore, that the president is not challenged politically
by minority or alternative viewpoints for an additional two years. 202
Shortening the length of presidential terms could enhance political discourse
by allowing other voices to enter the political arena more often.
Finally, the Constitution should be amended to impose term limits on
the president. As it stands, a Russian president is limited only to two
consecutive terms.203 This means that, as Putin has done, a president can
briefly relinquish power without losing his or her political power or control,
and that interim presidents assume the presidency only symbolically.204 As a
state with a long and arduous history of autocracy, and which has fought
constantly against falling into autocracy once more, shorter term limits
appear the most immediate avenue for Russia to avoid acquiescing to its
autocratic tendencies once more.
Regardless of whether the political remedies suggested above are
enacted, long-lasting reform will require fundamental legal reconstructions.
First, therefore, Russians should retract Putin’s election legislation which
has consolidated power in the Kremlin and undermined direct elections.205
Second, Russians should amend the 1993 Constitution to reinstate the
structural safeguards of the separation of powers and federalism. Together,
these changes could protect Russia from experiencing another constitutional
crisis.206
2.
Retracting Putin’s Regional Electoral Reforms and Eliminating the
Office of the Polpredy Will Restore Federalism in Russia
A restoration of the Constitution’s remedial safeguards should also be
achieved by reestablishing federalism in Russia. This can be achieved
through the repeal of Putin’s regional electoral changes and through the
elimination of the regional polpredy. The December 2011 parliamentary
elections, discussed in Part III.A.2, may have given the legislature the ability
to rescind the changes, in particular the legislation which established
presidential appointment for regional governors and consolidated power in
the political party United Russia.207
202
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As discussed above, Putin oversaw the passage of legislation that
ensures regional governors now serve the interests of the president. First, he
pushed through legislation that requires presidential approval of candidates
nominated for governor, and gave the president the power to appoint
governors.208 Additionally, he facilitated the passage of a federal law that
discharged the governors of their duty to appear at the capitol more than
once a month.209 In order for governors to be truly representative of their
districts, this legislation should be repealed. Doing so will help ensure that
the governors now represent the people’s interests, and not the
President’s.210
Furthermore, changes to the composition of the Council of the
Federation, brought about particularly by the fact that the governors, and not
the people now each appoint a representative to the Kremlin, have diluted
direct representation, and caused the upper chamber of Russia’s legislature
to be controlled by the Kremlin. 211 This has been reflected in the
compliance and passivity of the upper chamber of the Council.212 Those
legislators committed to democracy should restore direct election of
governors’ representatives in Russia’s people. This would bring about a
return to government by the people.
As described above, Putin created the office of the polpredy for each
of the seven super-districts in Russia, during his time as President.213 The
polpredy oversee the seven Russian districts, acting as watchdogs of the
president, supervising implementation of federal laws, and providing
information to the president. 214 The offices of the polpredy should be
abolished. Doing so will remove a level of oversight by the Kremlin,
allowing the seven districts to engage in self-governance free from Kremlin
control.215
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3.
Russia’s Multi-Party System Can Be Bolstered by Dissolving United
Russia, Supporting the Development of Minority Parties, and Rejecting
Excessive Political Patronage
Primarily through political patronage, Putin and his preferred party,
United Russia, have ensured that United Russia’s members in parliament
vote according to the president’s will.216 Evidencing this is the fact that the
last decade in the State Duma has seen remarkable cohesiveness in voting
for United Russia’s representatives.217 In order to bolster the development
of minority political parties, therefore, Russia’s leaders should reject the
political patronage of the past and recommit to democracy.
While democracy is occasionally susceptible to kickbacks and
lobbying,218 United Russia’s massive consolidation of power and capital has
ensured its control of most elective positions in Russia.219 This control by
United Russia has allowed Putin to win some significant legislative
victories, which have in turn compromised constitutional safeguards.220 In
order to ensure that the legislature attains independence from Putin and that
they represent the will of the people, the political patronage of the past
should be limited by attitudinal changes by the legislator and, if necessary,
legislative changes to limit the amount of acceptable patronage. 221 This
could be done through legislation, and would likely be bolstered by
reinstating direct representation, as described below. This would insulate
legislators slightly from executive control imposed through United Russia.222
Finally, because United Russia is now comprised of several political
factions, it should consider breaking into several smaller parties. While this
would likely require United Russia itself to make such a change, doing so
would bring to an end its monopoly on Russian governance and spread its
resources among various ideologies. More importantly, breaking up United
Russia will dilute its power and prevent it from continuing to keep Russia in
an indefinite autocracy. By diffusing United Russia’s solidarity, other
parties will be able to counterbalance control and penetrate Russian
government with their own candidates.
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CONCLUSION

Putin’s renewed reach for power and expected reelection demonstrate
that Russia is experiencing a constitutional crisis. As it stands today, the
Constitution can do nothing to revitalize the democratic structure of
government it created. This is demonstrated first, by Russia’s current
political crisis, evidenced by the demise of democracy in Russia. Second, it
is shown by the Constitution’s inability to remedy this crisis, which has
resulted from a breakdown in the Constitution’s structure and requirements,
specifically the collapse of the separation of powers, severe party
underdevelopment, and the failure of democracy in Russia.
Unfortunately, the Constitution contains the tools which have led to
its weakening and allowed for incremental legislation to undermine its
democratic safeguards. This is only possible if Russian leaders and citizens
experience an attitudinal change, using legislative and constitutional changes
to restore the Constitution’s safeguards and structure. While the struggle to
return to democracy is likely to be arduous and slow, it is undoubtedly
possible if Russian leaders and citizens garner the political will and strength
to demand a return to the Constitution that they adopted in 1993.

